

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BUCAR 04258 01 OF 02 201413Z

51

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SCI-06 SAJ-01 OMB-01 IO-14 ACDA-19

CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10

PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 USIA-15 NIC-01 EA-11

NEA-10 EB-11 CIEP-02 STR-08 TRSE-00 COME-00 DRC-01

/188 W

----- 039792

R 201336Z NOV 73

FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7027

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 BUCHAREST 4258

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR PINT RO

SUBJECT: ROMANIAN POLICY AND CEAUSESCU'S POSITION ON
THE EVE OF HIS U.S. VISIT

1. THE BROAD OUTLINES OF ROMANIAN FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICY ARE WELL ESTABLISHED AND WELL KNOWN AND DO NOT REQUIRE REPETITION HERE. WE DO WISH, IN THIS MESSAGE, TO COVER SOME OF THE HIGH POINTS OF THESE POLICIES, OF ROMANIA'S POSITION AND PREOCCUPATIONS AS WELL AS THE STABILITY OF CEAUSESCU'S POSITION ON THE EVE OF HIS TRIP TO THE U.S. WHATEVER DIFFERENCES MAY HAVE ARISEN IN THE LEADERSHIP DURING RECENT YEARS OVER SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF ROMANIAN POLICY, WE BELIEVE THERE IS A HIGH DEGREE OF CONSENSUS--VERGING ON UNANIMITY--CONCERNING THE ESSENTIAL DIRECTIONS OF BOTH FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICY.

2. BASIC ELEMENTS OF ROMANIAN FOREIGN POLICY. IN FOREIGN POLICY, ROMANIA IS FUNDAMENTALLY COMMITTED TO INCREASING INDEPENDENCE FROM THE USSR AND TO GROWTH OF NATIONAL POWER AND PRESTIGE WITHIN THE LIMITED RANGE AVAILABLE TO HER. THERE ARE CERTAINLY NO OVERT SIGNS OF ANY VIABLE PRO-
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BUCAR 04258 01 OF 02 201413Z

SOVIET ELEMENT THAT COULD THREATEN THE BASIC LONG-TERM

COMMITMENTS OF ROMANIAN NATIONALISM NOR DOES ONE HAVE ANY SENSE FROM INTERMITTENT BUT NONETHELESS RATHER EXTENDED CONTACTS WITH THE UPPER LEADERSHIP, THE SECONDARY ECHELONS (CC MEMBERS, MINISTERS, DEPUTY MINISTERS, ETC.) OR THE BROAD MIDDLE BUREAUCRATIC CLASS--MUCH LESS THE PEOPLE--THAT THERE CAN BE MUCH DISSEMBLING ON THIS SCORE. THE ROMANIAN STYLE OF FOREIGN POLICY IS ALSO FIRMLY EMBEDDED IN LONG NATIONAL TRADITION AND CURRENT REALITIES AND ACCORDINGLY SELDOM GIVES RISE TO STRONG DIFFERENCES CONCERNING THE OVERALL STYLE AND STRATEGY OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION. IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT ROMANIA MUST NOT SLAP THE SOVIETS TOO HARD, TOO OFTEN, OR TOO OFFENSIVELY BUT THAT STRENGTH OF PURPOSE MUST BE PRESERVED. THE CHINESE CARD IS PLAYED (AS ARE THE AMERICAN, THE UNDERDEVELOPED WORLD AND OTHER CARDS) IN A RESTRAINED AND ORCHESTRATED WAY IN WHICH PROGRESS TOWARD INDEPENDENCE IS GRADUALLY WIDENED BUT SHOCKS TO THE SOVIET EGO ARE GENERALLY AVOIDED.

3. THE ROMANIANS PLAY THEIR FOREIGN POLICY GAME WITH LONG-RANGE OBJECTIVES CONSTANTLY IN MIND AND WITH GREAT PERSEVERENCE AND PATIENCE. SUCH ROMANIAN PLOYS AS THOSE ON THE BALKANS, MBFR, CSCE, MIDDLE EAST "GOOD OFFICES," AND CEAUSESCU'S SEEMINGLY "GRANDSTANDING" STYLE OF OVERSEAS JOURNEYS AND INTERVIEWS SHOULD BE SEEN IN THIS LIGHT; THEY ARE NOT JUST WHAT THEY APPEAR TO BE--A DIRECT ENDEAVOR TO OBTAIN A PARTICULAR OVERT OBJECTIVE--BUT PARTS OF A SUSTAINED EFFORT TO GAIN GRADUAL ACCEPTANCE OF ROMANIAN LONG-TERM NATIONAL AIMS. THERE PROBABLY HAVE BEEN BEHIND-THE-SCENES DISPUTES ON SPECIFIC TACTICS AT TIMES AS WELL AS PERSONAL RIVALRIES (CORNELIU MANESCU'S OUSTER, RUMORED PERSONAL ANTAGONISM BETWEEN CURRENT FOREIGN MINISTER MACOVESCU AND PARTY SECRETARY STEFAN ANDREI AND KNOWN INFIGHTING BETWEEN SOME DEPUTY MINISTERS AND LESSER-FRY OVER JURISDICTIONS) BUT THESE PROBABLY SELDOM MATERIALLY AFFECT CEAUSESCU'S OWN RELATIONS WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE TOP LEADERSHIP.

4. THE ONLY EXCEPTIONS TO THIS PATTERN OF BROAD HIGH-LEVEL CONSENSUS IN FOREIGN POLICY ARE REPUTED DIFFERENCES OF ASSESSMENT AS TO WHAT ROMANIAN IS GETTING OUT OF ITS "OPENING

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BUCAR 04258 01 OF 02 201413Z

TO THE WEST." PRIVATE STATEMENTS AND INNUENDOS TO US FROM ROMANIANS THAT A SIGNIFICANT GROUP OF SENIOR ROMANIANS HAVE BEEN CRITICAL OF EXCESSIVE OPTIMISM ABOUT ROMANIA'S ABILITY TO TRADE WITH THE WEST SHOULD BE REGARDED AS PARTIALLY SELF-SERVING PLOYS TO CONVINCE AMERICANS TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING ON ISSUES LIKE MFN BUT WE DO FEEL THERE IS, IN FACT, SOME TRUTH TO THIS PICTURE AND THAT THIS ISSUE HAS PROBABLY BEEN A DIRECT OR AT LEAST INDIRECT ELEMENT IN LEADERSHIP

DISCUSSIONS. THESE DIFFERENCES ARE A MATTER OF DEGREE, OF COURSE; ALL SEEM TO BE COMMITTED TO TRADE WITH THE WEST TO SOME DEGREE AND ALL PROBABLY HAVE DOUBTS AND FELT DISAPPOINTMENTS ABOUT ROMANIA'S INABILITY TO ACHIEVE AS MUCH AS CONTEMPLATED; AS IN MOST THINGS THE PROBABLE DIFFERENCES ARE ONES OF DEGREE, EMPHASIS AND THE PRACTICAL CONCLUSIONS DRAWN ABOUT METHODS OF HANDLING THE PROBLEM.

5. INTERNAL POLICY AND STRESSES. WE BELIEVE THERE IS A LARGE ELEMENT OF CONSENSUS IN INTERNAL POLICY TOO ABOUT BASIC DIRECTIONS BUT GREATER DIFFERENCES COME TO THE FORE FROM TIME TO TIME ON TACTICS AND EMPHASIS, WITH PRIVATE AMBITIONS AND RIVALRIES ALSO INTERMESHD WITH THESE FACTORS. THE POSTULATES OF GENERAL CONSENSUS INCLUDE CONTINUED DIVERSIFICATION OF THE ECONOMY, RAPID PRIORITY DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRY, A VERY HIGH RE-INVESTMENT RATE WITH ITS COROLLARY OF SHORT SHRIFT TO THE CONSUMER, HEAVY EMPHASIS ON FOREIGN TRADE WITH THE WEST, TIGHT CONTROLS OVER THE POPULACE IN VIEW OF THE UNDERLYING STRESSES CAUSED BY THE ABOVE FACTORS, A COMMUNIST IDEOLOGICAL AND MORAL APPROACH IN THEORY BECOMING HIGHLY PRAGMATIC IN PRACTICE WITH LITTLE MORE THAN LIP-SERVICE GIVEN TO IDEOLOGY BY MOST (INCLUDING MOST MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND OTHER HIGHER PARTY ORGANS). THERE ALSO SEEMS TO BE A CONSIDERABLE MEASURE OF AGREEMENT ON THE NEED FOR A DOMINANT PUBLIC POSITION FOR ONE MAN (CEAUSESCU) IN ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE UNITY AND PREVENT EXTERNAL MANIPULATION OF DIFFERENCES OR POTENTIAL DIFFERENCES.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BUCAR 04258 02 OF 02 201431Z

51

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SCI-06 SAJ-01 OMB-01 IO-14 ACDA-19

CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10

PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 USIA-15 NIC-01 EA-11

NEA-10 EB-11 CIEP-02 STR-08 TRSE-00 COME-00 DRC-01

/188 W

----- 040002

R 201336Z NOV 73
FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7028

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 BUCHAREST 4258

6. DESPITE THIS GENERAL CONSENSUS OF APPROACH, THE LAST FEW YEARS HAVE WITNESSED SUB-SURGACE CONFLICTS OVER A WIDE VARIETY OF ISSUES, OF WHICH THE PACE OF RAPID INDUSTRIALIZATION AND PRESSURE ON THE POPULACE SEEMED TO BE THE MOST RECENT AND SERIOUS BONE OF CONTENTION. THESE DIFFERENCES HAVE FADED INTO THE BACKGROUND IN THE LAST YEAR, HOWEVER, PARTLY BECAUSE CEAUSESCU HEMSILF RETREATED FROM THE FOUR-AND-ONE-HALF YEAR SLOGAN WITH WHICH HE APPEARED TO BE ALMOST OBSESSED IN MID-1972, AND PARTLY BECUASE THE LEADERSHIP IS AWAITING THE RESULTS OF THE THIRD PLAN YEAR AS A PRELUDE TO THE MANEUVERING THAT WILL PROBABLY BEGIN THEREAFTER IN PREPARATION FOR THE ELEVENTH PARTY CONGRESS. MANY LEADERSHIP CHANGES ARE NOW LONG OVERDUE, IN FACT, AND AT LEAST SOME OF THEM SHOULD BE RESOLVED NEXT YEAR. THERE REMAINS MUCH THAT WE DO NOT KNOW ABOUT THESE INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF POWER, OF COURSE, INCLUDING RECURRING EVIDENCE OF DIFFICULTIES CENTERING ON THE SECURITY ORGANS, WHICH HAVE EXPERIENCED EXTENSIVE AND REPEATED TURNOVERS AT THE TOP SINCE 1971.

7. CEAUSESCU'S POSITION AND THE "PERSONALITY CULT." IT IS EASY BUT IN OUR VIEW MISTAKEN TO LOOK ON ROMANIA AS "NEO-CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BUCCHAR 04258 02 OF 02 201431Z

STALINIST" DESPITE SUPERFICIAL SIMILARITIES WITH STALINISM FROM MANY ANGLES, INCLUDING THE POSITION OF THE TOP MAN. CEAUSESCU, WE BELIEVE, DOES NOT HAVE UNRESTRICTED POWER BUT MYST MANIPULATE AND MANEUVER IN A COMPLEX AND SHIFTING INTERNAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT. LIKE ANY GOOD POLITICIAN, THE POSITIONS HE ADOPTS ARE SOMETIMES A MERE TACTICAL STANCE OF BALANCING BETWEEN DIVERSE PRESSURES (THE SUMMER OF 1971, NOTABLY THE "IDEOLOGICAL" CAMPAIGN THEN, WAS A GOOD EXAMPLE) WHILE AT OTHER TIMES HE HIMSELF IS ESSENTIALLY A COMBATATIVE ADVOCATE OF A SPECIAL POSITION--EVEN AN UNPOPULAR ONE--AS SEEMED TO BE THE CASE ON THE FOUR AND ONE-HALF YEAR PLAN COMPLETION ISSUE LAST SUMMER.

8. ALTHOUGH PERHAPS SYMPTOMATIC OF FUNDAMENTAL INSECURITIES, AN OVERALL SOURCE OF STRENGTH--DESPITE ITS SUSCEPTIBILITY TO RIDICULE--IS THE SO-CALLED PERSONALITY CULT. WE THINK THE NEED TO ELEVATE CEAUSESCU IS RECOGNIZED BY ALL (OR AT LEAST MOST) OF THE TOP LEADERSHIP TO PROTECT FROM ATTACK BOTH THE FOREIGN POLICY GOALS AND AMBITIOUS INTERNAL PROGRAM MENTIONED EARLIER. CEAUSESCU AND HIS CLOSEST SUP-

PORTERS HAVE PROBABLY ALSO USED THIS "CULT" TO DOMINATE AND SILENCE OPPOSITION TO UNPOPULAR INTERNAL POLICIES THAT CEAUSESCU PRESSES MORE THAN OTHERS--AND AS AN INSTRUMENT TO CONTINUE CONVERTING THE MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT INTO A MORE PLIANT TOOL.

9. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE BELIEVE THAT MUCH OF THE OLDER LEADERSHIP, ALTHOUGH THEY SUPPORTED CEAUSESCU AGAINST DRAGHICI, APOSTOL AND OTHER RIVALS FOR THE POST GHEORGHIU-DEJ SUCCESSION IN THE MID-1960'S, ARE FAR FROM CEAUSESCU "YES-MEN" AND THAT CEAUSESCU HAS OCCASIONAL TROUBLE WITH THEM ON SPECIFIC ISSUES. HE HAS ACCORDINGLY RELIED OR ATTEMPTED TO RELY ON YOUNGER FOLLOWERS LIKE BURTICA AND ANDREI WITHOUT INDEPENDENT PRESTIGE OR ORGANIZATIONAL FOLLOWING IN THE LAST FEW YEARS, ESPECIALLY IN THE SECRETARIAT, AND HAS PARTLY SUCCEEDED IN REDUCING THE WEIGHT OF MORE INDEPENDENT MEN LIKE NICULESCU-MIZIL, MAURER AND TROFIN THEREBY. IN THE MEANTIME, CEAUSESCU APPEARS TO HAVE THE FIRM BACKING OF THE ENEMY AND, INCREASINGLY, OF THE PARTY APPARATUS UNDER PANA. HE APPEARS AS STRONG TODAY
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BUCAR 04258 02 OF 02 201431Z

AS EVER ALTHOUGH THE STRESSES CAUSED BY HIS PERSONALIZED RULE, AND THE HARDSHIPS VISITED NOT ONLY ON THE POPULACE BUT THE SECONDARY ELITE, COULD MAKE HIM VULNERABLE IN ROUGHER POLITICAL SEAS, PERHAPS ORIGINATING IN DISPUTES OVER ECONOMIC PROBLEMS.

10. CONCLUSIONS. DESPITE INTERNAL STRESSES AND EXTERNAL VULNERABILITIES, CEAUSESCU COMES TO THE U.S. AS THE UNDISPUTED LEADER OF A HIGHLY DISCIPLINED STATE IN WHICH EVEN THOSE WHO DISLIKE ASPECTS OF HIS PERSONALITY AND POLICIES REGARD HIM AS INDISPENSABLE TO THEIR OWN COMMITMENT TO ROMANIAN INDEPENDENCE AND MODERNIZATION. NEVER FEELING COMPLETELY SECURE IN EITHER THE NATIONAL OR PERSONAL SENSE, HOWEVER, CEAUSESCU WANTS STRONGLY TO SHOW "SUCCESS" DURING TRIPS LIKE THIS ONE AND ESPECIALLY TO QUIETEN SKEPTICAL AND POTENTIALLY SKEPTICAL VOICES THAT ROMANIA'S EFFORTS TO OPEN TO THE WEST--OR AWAY FROM THE SOVIETS GENERALLY--ARE NOT SUFFICIENTLY REALISTIC. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE ROMANIANS AROUND WHO ARE PERSONALLY MORE APPEALING TO WESTERN TASTES, CEAUSESCU IS THE ONLY HORSE AVAILABLE AND PERHAPS HIS VERY TOUGHNESS AND EGOCENTRICITY ARE EVEN ASSETS TO OUR OWN POLICY INTEREST IN SEEING ROMANIAN INDEPENDENCE FLOURISH AND CONTINUE AS A LONG-TERM FORCE FOR A MORE DIVERSE WORLD.
MARTENS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 20 NOV 1973
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: morefirh
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973BUCHAR04258
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: n/a
From: BUCHAREST
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19731123/aaaaaqzb.tel
Line Count: 275
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: morefirh
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 26 SEP 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <26-Sep-2001 by freemaal>; APPROVED <06-Nov-2001 by morefirh>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: ROMANIAN POLICY AND CEAUSESCU'S POSITION ON THE EVE OF HIS U.S. VISIT
TAGS: PFOR, PINT, RO
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005